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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
proper county. Improper venue is not a jurisdictional defect and there-
fore the court may properly hear the case if a party defendant does not
timely object to it. It has been noted that improper venue creates a
greater problem in courts of limited territorial jurisdiction where venue
requirements are waived more readily by the parties. A prominent
consideration for the venue requirements is to distribute the court's
business on a relatively even basis among the five counties.25
This consideration was decisive in Towers v. Long Island Prop-
erties Inc., 255 a negligence action brought in New York County
where the cause of action arose. Since both parties resided in Queens
County, the venue was improper under CCA 301.256 Although the
defendant made no objection, the court on its own motion transferred
the action to Queens County pursuant to CCA 306, noting the over-
burdening case load in New York County.257 Judge Weiss took the
opportunity to publicly announce to the bar that the court will no
longer tolerate "the imposition of a case load emanating from the
flagrant contravention of the requisites of proper venue .... ,,21s
Judge Weiss cited the administrative judge's directive of June 19,
1970,259 which was enacted some six months later as subparagraph (b)
of CCR section 2900.3,260 in support of his conclusion that there has
been a "cavalier disregard" of CCA 301.
The Towers case is significant (1) as a caveat to the bar to avoid
improper venue, since the courts will readily transfer actions on their
own motion, and (2) for its discussion of CCR section 2900.3 and the
aforementioned directive.
CONTEMPT
Contempt: Criminal contempt fines payable to City Treasury.
The fines which result from criminal contempt proceedings have
traditionally been regarded as payable to the state.261 At the same time,
254 See 29A McKINNEY'S CCA 01, commentary at 70 (1963).
255 67 Misc. 2d 1062, 325 N.YS.2d 605 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
256 CCA 301 sets out the venue requirements for the civil court. The primary basis
of venue is the place of residence of one of the parties, with other stated bases of venue
being proper if no party has a residence in New York City.
257 67 Misc. 2d 1062, 325 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971). See also
Blackstone Institute v. Agnelli, 153 Misc. 760, 276 N.Y.S. 713 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. N.Y. County
1935); Seligman Fabrics Corp. v. Bur-Lee Frocks, Inc., 150 Misc. 537, 260 N.Y.S. 649 (N.Y.
City Ct. Bronx County 1934).
258 67 Misc. 2d 1062, 325 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
259 Id. at 1063-64, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 606-07.
260 CCR 2900.3 states that "[t]he clerk shall not accept a summons for filing when
it appears upon its face that the proper venue is a county division other than the one
where it is offered for filing." Id. at 1064, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
261 People ex rel. Steams v. Marr, 181 N.Y. 463, 74 N.E. 431 (1905); see King v. Barnes,
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fines imposed for a civil contempt have been utilized to redress the
aggrieved party.20 2 The basis for the distinction stems from the nature
of the two offenses: Criminal contempt is "an offense against public
justice, the penalty for which is essentially punitive, while the other
is an invasion of private right, the penalty for which is redress or com-
pensation to the suitor."263 In New York, the statutory provisions em-
bodying this distinction are found in sections 751 (criminal) and 773
(civil) of the Judiciary Law.
In 1967, however, in conjunction with New York's enactment of
the Taylor Law,2 64 section 751 was enlarged to provide for the impo-
sition of criminal contempt penalties in the event public employees
strike.200 Additionally, the Taylor Law provides that, in the event of
a strike, the governmental unit involved must apply for injunctive
relief, which, if granted and subsequently defied by the employee
organization, is to be followed by the institution of criminal contempt
proceedings under the Judiciary Law.266
As a result, the anomalous situation can arise wherein a munici-
113 N.Y. 476, 21 N.E. 182 (1889); see also Englander Co. v. Tishler, 285 App. Div. 1070,
139 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1955). The earlier cases indicate that criminal contempt fines
were payable to the "public treasury." Exactly how the "public treasury" became the
"state treasury" is not clear. Compare People ex rel. Munsell v. Court of Oyer & Terminer,
101 N.Y. 245, 248, 4 N.E. 259, 260 (1886) with 1944 N.Y. ATr'y GEN. REP. 197.
202 See King v. Barnes, 113 N.Y. 476, 21 N.E. 182 (1889). See also Stewart v. Smith,
186 App. Div. 755, 175 N.Y.S. 468 (Ist Dep't 1919); Brill v. Brill, 148 App. Div. 63, 131
N.Y.S. 1030 (Ist Dep't 1911).
263 King v. Barnes, 113 N.Y. at 480, 21 N.E. at 183.
264 N.Y. CrvM SERV. LA.W §§ 200 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1971). Section 210(1) states:
No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no pub-
lic employee or employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone
a strike.
26 Section 751(2)(a) states in part:
Where an employee organization . . . wilfully disobeys a lawful mandate of a
court of record or wilfully offer resistance to such lawful mandate, in a case in-
volving or growing out of a strike in violation of subdivision one of section two
hundred ten of the civil service law, the punishment for each day that such con-
tempt persists may be by a fine fixed in the direction of the court....
N.Y. JuDIcIARY LAW § 751(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1971). The original amendment of sec-
tion 751 did not permit the court to utilize "discretion" in determining the amount of the
fine. A second amendment, permitting discretion, was enacted as L. 1971, ch. 503, § 17,
and became effective on June 17, 1971.
266 [Wihere it appears that public employees ... threaten or are about to do, or
are doing, an act in violation of section two hundred ten of this article, the chief
executive officer of the government involved shall (a) forthwith notify the chief
legal officer.., and (b) provide such chief legal officer with such facilities ... as
will enable the chief legal officer to carry out his duties under this section ....
If an order of the court enjoining or restraining such violation does not receive
compliance, such chief legal officer shall forthwith apply to the supreme court to
punish such violation under section seven hundred fifty of the judiciary law.
N.Y. CWiL SERv. IAW § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1971). The statute was construed as com-
pelling application to the court in Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283
N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 29 App. Div. 634, 286 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1st Dep't
1967).
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pality, having suffered the economic hardships resulting from both a
public employee strike and mandatory litigation expenses, would see
any contempt penalties ultimately imposed paid to the state.
Precisely this situation arose in Goodman v. State of New York.2 67
Plaintiff Goodman, as Clerk of the Supreme Court in New York
County, became the holder of contempt fines resulting from proceed-
ings instituted by the city against certain public employee unions.
Both the city and state claimed the funds, the former because they
resulted from litigation which the city was required to initiate,268 the
latter because the funds were punitive and not compensatory in nature.
The court acknowledged that while the city was clearly the aggrieved
party, the proceedings under which the fines were imposed were crim-
inal and therefore the fines were not considered compensatory. But the
court viewed the city as acting in a dual capacity, not only as the ag-
grieved party but also as the party statutorily compelled to institute the
proceedings:
In this posture, with the local governmental body ... man-
dated to the expenses of litigation and protection of the rights of
its constituent public, it lies implicit in the statute [Judiciary Law
§ 751(2)] that fines collected thereunder belong to that govern-
mental body responsible for enforcement of the statute.269
Though subject to criticism, the Taylor Law was at least designed
to allow governmental operation to proceed unimpeded by public em-
ployee strikes or threats of strike. When those operations are impeded,
the parties who primarily suffer are the governmental body against
which the strike is called and its constituents. Under the facts in Good-
man, it would clearly be inequitable to allow the state, which has suf-
fered minimally in comparison to the city, to recover the penalties.
SUMMARY PROCEEDING
Summary proceeding: Purpose of summary proceeding frustrated by
litigious party.
The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is to avoid the
necessity of a trial.270 In the landlord-tenant area, the proceeding by
which such judgment is obtained was "designed to provide the land-
207 67 Misc. 2d 877, 325 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
268 See note 266 supra.
269 67 Misc. 2d at 878, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
270 Smyser, The Summary Judgment- Ascertainment of the Genuine Issue, 16 S.D.L.
REv. 20 (1971).
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